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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j). It subsequently assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, which has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 
Whether the trial court incorrectly concluded that because "the defendants knew about 
this lawsuit in the spring of 1996[,]... there is no reason to set aside the default judgment" 
for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Issue Preserved R. at 39-42, 55-58). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because Rule 4 governs service of process and because whether service of 
process was proper is a jurisdictional issue, the standard of review is a 
correction of error standard: 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is 
ordinarily reversed only for an abuse of discretion. However, 
when a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack 
of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction 
is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due 
process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the 
propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the 
decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law upon which 
we do not defer to the district court. 
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State Dep yt 
ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted)) (citations 
omitted). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b): 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, 
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision 
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This 
rule does not limit the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This 
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment 
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1): 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2), (3), 
or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to the 
individually personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house 
or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint to an 
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. 
93683.SE526.049 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASF 
I. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from an order denying Khosrow B. Semnani's and Ghazaleh Semnani's 
(Mr. and Mrs. Semnani) Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution 
entered by Judge Michael K. Burton on February 23, 1999. R. at 61-62. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
On May 17, 1996, Plaintiff Southland Construction (Southland) filed a complaint 
against Mr. and Mrs. Semnani alleging breach of contract and quantum meruit and seeking 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien. R. at 1. On May 24, 1996, a Summons was left with an 
unknown person at 4346 Mulholland Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (Mulholland Property). 
R. at 7, 9. On April 9, 1998, Default Judgment was entered against Mr. and Mrs. Semnani 
based upon Southland's representation that service of process had been accomplished at the 
Mulholland Property. R. at 26. On or about August 10, 1998, a Writ of Execution was 
signed by the clerk of the court. R. at 27-33. 
On December 3, 1998, Mr. and Mrs. Semnani filed a Motion to Vacate Default 
Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution. R. at 37. On February 23, 1999, the Third District 
Court, Judge Michael K. Burton, entered the Order on Defendants' Motion to Vacate 
Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution concluding that because "the defendants knew about 
this lawsuit in the spring of 1996[,]... there is no reason to set aside the default judgment." 
R. at 61-62. 
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III. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 17,1996, Southland filed a complaint against Mr. and Mrs. Semnani alleging 
breach of contract and quantum meruit and seeking to foreclose a mechanic's lien. R. at 1. 
On May 24,1996, a Summons was left with an unknown person at the Mulholland Property. 
See Summons and Affidavits of Service, R. at 6-9 (copies are attached and hereinafter 
referred to as Exhibit A). The Mulholland Property was not the dwelling or place of abode 
of Mr. and Mrs. Semnani at the time the Summons was left with the unidentified person at 
the Mulholland Property. See Affidavit Supp. M. Vacate Default J. & Quash Writ of 
Execution f 4 (Semnani Aff.), R. at 44-46 (a copy is attached and hereinafter referred to as 
Exhibit B). Although the Mulholland Property was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Semnani, the 
property was leased to a tenant. See Ex. B f 5. At the time of the alleged service, Mr. and 
Mrs. Semnani resided at 4455 South Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. See Ex. B ^ f 3. 
On April 9, 1998, almost two years later, Default Judgment was entered against Mr. 
and Mrs. Semnani based upon Southland's representation that service of process had been 
accomplished at the Mulholland Property. See Default Judgment, R. at 25-26 (a copy is 
attached and hereinafter referred to as Exhibit C). On or about August 31, 1998, Mr. and 
Mrs. Semnani were served with a Writ of Execution, which was the first notice to them of 
the filing of the action and the April 9, 1998, entry of Default Judgment. See Ex. B | 7. 
On December 3, 1998, Mr. and Mrs. Semnani filed a Motion to Vacate Default 
Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution. R. at 37. In response to the Motion to Vacate, 
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Southland filed an affidavit that it "believe[d]" the Defendants knew about the lawsuit and 
were actually served. See Affidavit of Ann Garza fflf 3,7 (Garza Aff.) (a copy is attached and 
hereinafter referred to as Exhibit D). 
The Third District Court, Judge Michael K. Burton, entered the Order on Defendants' 
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution on February 23, 1999, concluding 
that because "the defendants knew about this lawsuit in the spring of 1996[,] . . . there is no 
reason to set aside the default judgment." R. at 61-62 (a copy of the Order is attached as 
Exhibit E). | 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that because Mr. and Mrs. Semnani knew about 
the lawsuit in the spring of 1996, their motion to vacate the default judgment should be 
denied. First, Rule 4(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a summons 
either (1) be personally given to the defendant in question, (2) be left with a person at the 
I 
defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode, or (3) be served on the defendant's agent 
for service of process. The only evidence in the record before the trial court pertaining to the 
Rule 4(e) requirements was that (1) Mr. and Mrs. Semani had never received service of 
process and (2) the defendants did not reside at the address at which the summons was 
served. Accordingly, service of summons was improper. 
Further, the trial court incorrectly concluded that knowledge of a cause of action is 
sufficient to give the trial court jurisdiction. This is incorrect because a court obtains 
93683 SE526 049 5 
personal jurisdiction of a defendant only by proper service of summons. Hence, the trial 
court incorrectly denied Mr. and Mrs. Semnani's motion to vacate the default judgment for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD APPLICABLE TO RULE 60(B) MOTIONS 
In the trial court, Mr. and Mrs. Semnani filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate the default judgment for deficient service of process. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[o]n motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (4) the judgment is void;... or (6) 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
Although ordinarily a trial court has discretion to determine whether a motion to vacate a 
judgment should be granted, "when a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack 
of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment 
cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs." State Dep't of 
Soc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130,1132 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). Furthermore, "[t]he 
courts will generally grant relief in doubtful cases so that a party may have a hearing.... We 
view a default judgment with a careful eye " Board of Ed. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 
93683.SE526.049 6 
P.2d 806, 807 (1963). l 
II. T H E TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DENIED THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO VACATE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BASED ON THEIR "ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE" 
A,, Service of Process Did Not Conform To Rule 4(e) Requirements 
Rule 4(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that personal service shall 
be made: 
Upon any individual . . . by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the 
complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the 
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service 
of process. 
The only admissible evidence in the record before the trial court pertaining to the Rule 
4(e) requirements was that (1) the defendants had never received service of process and (2) 
the defendants did not reside at the address at which the summons was served. See Ex. B. 
The Plaintiff made no attempt to contradict the allegations of the Affidavit supporting the 
Motion. Rather, it submitted the Affidavit of Ann Garza, declaring only that Ms. Garza 
"believes" that the Defendants were properly served at the Mulholland Street property 
because (1) shortly after the service date, she received a telephone call from Ghazaleh 
1A motion brought under rules 60(b)(4) to 60(b)(6) is not time-barred by the three 
month rule, and "'where the judgment is void because of a fatally defective service of 
process, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have no application."' See Bonneville Billing v. 
Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 
288, 290 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) ("The motion shall be 
made . . . for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment... ."). 
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Semnani asking "what [she] was doing," (2) Mrs. Semnani called Brinton Electric 
demanding to know the cost of certain appliances, (3) a friend of Mrs. Semnani said that Mr. 
and Mrs. Semnani lived at the Mulholland Property and, finally, (4) Ms. Garza had caused 
a mechanic's lien to be filed and that the "Defendants signed accepting the lien." 
These allegations do not support a conclusion that the Court had jurisdiction. First, 
the statements in the affidavit are inadmissible. To be admissible, an affidavit must be made 
on personal knowledge and, where necessary, recite facts sufficient to establish the affiant's 
competence to testify to the facts set forth in the affidavit. See Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. 
Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 
768, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Hearsay testimony is also inadmissible, see Utah R. Evid. 
802, unless the evidence falls into an exception described by Rules 803 and 804. 
The recitals in the Garza Affidavit amount to conjecture and, except for the single 
declaration that Mrs. Ghazaleh Semnani had telephoned Ann Garza, are not supported by any 
recitation or evidence, as required by Utah Rule of Evidence 602, that Ms. Garza had 
personal knowledge of the matters to which she testified. Further, the statements that Mrs. 
Semnani called Brinton Electrical demanding to know the cost of appliances and that a friend 
of Mrs. Semnani told Ms. Garza that Mr. and Mrs. Semnani "lived at the address of 
Mulholland" are, without question, hearsay. Accordingly, there is no admissible evidence 
contradicting the Semnani Affidavit. 
Besides the fact that the recitals in the Garza Affidavit are inadmissible, it is not 
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possible to conclude from them that either of the Defendants had either (1) personally 
received service of process or (2) process was left at their dwelling house or usual place of 
abode as required by Utah Civil Procedure Rule 4. Accordingly, the trial court did not 
conclude that Mr. and Mrs. Semnani had received proper service. See Ex. E. 
Because there was no admissible evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Semnani had personally 
received service of process or that process was left at their residence or usual place of abode, 
the trial court had no basis upon which to determine that it had acquired jurisdiction over the 
them. See Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (holding that 
without effective service of process, the court lacked jurisdiction). Thus, the default 
judgment entered in this case is void, see id., and Mr. and Mrs. Semnani's motion to vacate 
the default judgment should have been granted. Vijil, 784 P.2d at 1132. Accordingly, the 
trial court incorrectly denied their motion. 
IL Actual Knowledge is Insufficient to Confer Personal Jurisdiction 
Despite the obvious fact that service of process was improper and, hence, the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction, the trial court concluded that because "the defendants knew about 
this lawsuit in the spring of 1996[,] . . . there is no reason to set aside the default judgment." 
Ex. E. 
However, whether Mr. and Mrs. Semnani had actual knowledge of Southland's claim 
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is irrelevant to a determination of jurisdiction.2 The Utah Supreme Court has declared on 
several occasions that, for a court to have jurisdiction, service must be made strictly in 
conformity with the statutes and rules and that actual knowledge of a complaint is 
insufficient to confer jurisdiction. In one case, the court held that a trial court had no 
jurisdiction when, rather than serve notice according to statutory mandate, a plaintiff mailed 
a copy of a change of court designation to a defendant who had already received summons 
correct in every other respect. In doing so, it stated: 
The requisite formalities of the summons and the manner of service prescribed 
by law are intended to assure to the recipient the bona fides of the court 
process and the importance of his giving serious attention thereto. These 
cannot be supplanted by mere notice by letter, telephone or any other such 
means. 
Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 36 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 
1965). In a similar case, where the plaintiff served an agent of a corporation, but not the 
registered agent as required by statute, the Court declared: 
Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is 
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, not actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action, which confers jurisdiction. Otherwise, a 
defendant could never object to the sufficiency of service of process, since he 
must have knowledge of the suit to make such objection. The proper issuance 
and service of summons is the means of invoking the jurisdiction over the 
defendant; these cannot be supplanted by mere notice by letter, telephone or 
any other such means. 
2
 As shown above, even assuming that facts relating to the actual knowledge of Mr. 
and Mrs. Semnani are relevant to the issue at question, the statements made in the Garza 
Affidavit are inadmissible and cannot be considered by this Court. See supra discussion part 
II.A. 
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Murdoch v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 167 (1971) (emphasis added & footnotes 
omitted); see also Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836-37 (Tex. 1991) ("Actual notice to 
a defendant, without proper service, is not sufficient to convey upon the court jurisdiction to 
render default judgment against him."); Dietrich v. Elliott, 528 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Wis. 1995) 
("When a statute provides for service that confers jurisdiction over a party, there must be 
strict compliance with statutory service requirements."). The reason for this strict 
compliance requirement is that the state has an interest in protecting a defendant's "interest 
in being informed of the pending action filed against [it] and in having the opportunity to 
defend against that action." Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, there was no evidence before the trial court that the Plaintiff personally 
served Mr. and Mrs. Semnani or left process at their residence or usual place of abode. 
Further, the trial court denied Mr. and Mrs. Semnani's motion to set aside the default 
judgment based solely on its finding that they "actually knew about this lawsuit." 
Accordingly, the trial court incorrectly concluded that it had jurisdiction to enter a default 
judgment in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's error in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment was clear. 
In holding as it did, the trial court failed to consider the requirements of Rule 4(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and, instead, relied upon its finding that Mr. and Mrs. Semnani 
actually knew about the lawsuit. A trial court does not obtain jurisdiction by a litigant's 
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actual knowledge of a lawsuit. Accordingly, Mr. and Mrs. Semnani respectfully request that 
the trial court's order denying their motion to vacate the default judgment and quash writ of 
execution be reversed. 
DATED this l ^ c f a y of June, 1999. 
NIELS 
G$pfA. Weston 
D. Scott Crook 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / y c l a y of June, 1999,1 caused two true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be served via United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Randy B. Birch, Esq. 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
Post Office Box 763 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Summons and Affidavits of Service 
B. Affidavit in Support of Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Quash Writ of 
Execution 
C. Default Judgement 
D. Affidavit of Ann Garza in Response to Motion to Set Aside Default 
E. Order on Defendants' Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Quash Writ of 
Execution 
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CASE NO. 9to&>f4Z7£* 
JUDGE ^uH>\_ 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT KHOSROW B.SEMNANI: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the Clerk of the 
above-entitled Court at 5022 S. State, Murray, UT 84107, a written 
answer to the attached ' Complaint, and to serve upon or mail to 
Plaintiff's attorney, Randy B. Birch, BERTCH & BIRCH, at 5296 South 
Commerce Dr., Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT 84107, a copy of your 
answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you, 
or thirty (30) days if you reside outside the State of Utah. 
If you fail to so answer, judgment by default will be taken against 
you for the relief demanded in said complaint which has been filed with 
the clerk of said court and a copy of which is hereto annexed and 
herewith served upon you. 
Dated this May 16, 1996. 
Defendant's Address: 
43464 MULHOLLAND ST. -$JQ C 
SLC, UT ^ 
Salt Lake County 




AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
COOWiTOF SALTLAKE / \9TA*/ 
i, DAVID GRIFFIN 
_eing a resident of the State of UT, and a citizen of the United States over the age of 18 years at the time of service herein, and 
not a part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 20 DAY 
SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 20 DAY 
, and served the same upon n May 20,1996 
GAZALSEMNANI KHOSROWSEMNANI 
a within named Defendant in said article(s) by serving a true copy of said article(s) for the defendant with 
JOHN DOE (JOHN DOE (REFUSED I.D.)) 
person of suitable age and discretion there residing at 
4346 S MULHOLLAND STf SALT LAKE CITY 
' is/her usual plac$ of ABODE, on May 24,1996 
further certify th$t at the time of service of the said article(s), I endorsed the date and place of service and added my name 
and official title thereto. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
May 24,1996. 
<^s*s. NCe IA5Y ^ s u c 
/•fiS^A STATE OF UTAH 
• -*/K^P&- w *ty Commission Expires 
i
-'• 't&iffi **) Member 19,1S29 
\\%%%M ALANNAWA.RNICK 
<>\^y 1088S s ^ S t a * 
* n u n — — — I I I I „ . ,
 | M | ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
Oefena'arrf: GXZWr. SEMNANf 
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Commerce Dr., Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT 84107, a copy of your 
answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you, 
or thirty (30) days if you reside outside the State of Utah. 
If you fail to so answer, judgment by default will be taken against 
you for the relief demanded in said complaint which has been filed with 
the clerk of said court and a copy of which is hereto annexed and 
herewith served upon you. 
Dated this May 16, 1996. 
Defendant's Address: 
4346$ MULHOLLAND ST. -tyjQ C 
SLC, UT ^' 
Salt Lake County 




AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
:OUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
' DAVID GRIFFIN 
a resident of the State of UT, and a citizen of the United States over the age of 18 years at the time of service herein, and 
* part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
UMMONS & COMPLAINT 20 DAY 
UMMONS & COMPLAINT 20 DAY 
' lay 20,1996 , and served the same upon 
AZAL SEMNANI KHOSROW SEMNANI 
thin named Defendant in said article(s) by serving a true copy of said article(s) for the defendant with 
'OHN DOE (JOHN DOE (REFUSED I.D.)) 
son of suitable age and discretion there residing at 
-346 S MULHOLLAND ST, SALT LAKE CITY 
ier usual place of ABODE, on May 24,1996 
ier certify that at the time of service of the said article(s), I endorsed the date and place of service and added my name 
fficial title thereto. 





*f }S| Neverr.-^r <$, 1S38 
ALANNA VYARNICK 
t0<sbt> S-;u:n Slate 
Sana*, ^ r . o4^70 
NOTARY PUBLIC Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 






;.idant: GAZAL SEMNANI NOTES Docket #23807 
a 
TabB 
Gary A. Weston, USB No. 3435 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. - „ . 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 '" '"L'"' • 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Defendants 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
MURRAY DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHLAND CONSTRUCTION, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
GHAZALEH SEMNANI and KHOSROW ; 
B. SEMNANI, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
1 TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
I AND QUASH WRIT OF EXECUTION 
) Civil No. 960004927 
I Judge Michael K. Burton 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
KHOSROW B. SEMNANI, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am one of the defendants in this action. 
2. I and the defendant Ghazaleh Semnani, inaccurately referred to in the action as 
Gazal Semnani, are husband and wife, having married on January 16, 1983. Ghazaleh Semnani 
87258.SE526.001 
and I are the owners of the property at 4346 Mulholland Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 
("Mulholland Street property") and were the owners of said property all during calendar year 
1996. 
3. Currently and ever since the summer of 1986, Ghazaleh Semnani and I have 
resided together in our current residence at 4455 South Covecrest Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
4. Ghazaleh Semnani and I occupied the Mulholland Street property as our residence 
for a short time in 1986. We have not at any time since 1986 resided at said property nor since 
said time has it constituted our dwelling house or usual place of abode. 
5. The Mulholland Street property was leased to Mr. Reed. J. Bowen from 
December 1994 to July 1, 1996. Mr. Bowen failed to make the monthly rental payments owing 
for the months of May, June and July, 1996 and eventually vacated the said property. I believe 
he vacated the same on about July 1,1996. 
6. On or about August 31,1998, an officer of the Department of the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County, Utah left with me a certain Writ of Execution dated August 10, 1998, therein 
declaring that a judgment had been rendered against me in this action. 
7. Prior to my receipt of the said Writ of Execution, I had no knowledge that this 
action had been commenced against me and my wife, nor that any judgment had been entered 
against us in this action. 
87258 SE526 001 2 
DATED this _2 day of December, 1998 
Notary K" " 
/.?.1 Wast Krfccj^'' 
C :#:t*i Jordan, Uio * -
f - CcfT/nisiicn L • 
Cspisrcbor 13, tw. 







f6iosrow B. Semnani 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3 day of December, 1998. 
Cl^^t^^- # ^iPa QL/V-QJXXJ^ 
Commission expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing in: 5vs,ftJhAftlr/ On^c fc i t 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _2t^kl of December, 1998,1 did cause a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO VACATE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND WRIT OF EXECUTION to be mailed, U.S. mails, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Randy B. Birch, Esq. 
Bertch & Birch 
Post Office Box 763 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
87258 SE526.001 
TabC 
Randy B. Birch, #4197 
BERTCH & BIRCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
5296 South Commerce Drive, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone (801) 262-5300 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
SOUTHLAND CONSTRUCTION : DEFAULT JUDGEMENT 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
PLAINTIFF, : 
vs. : CASE NO. 96000492CV 
GAZAL SEMNANI AND KHOSROW B. : JUDGE: BURTON 
SEMNANI, 
DEFENDANTS. 
In this action, the Defendants Gazal Semnani and Khosrow B. 
Semnani having been regularly served with process and having failed 
to appear and answer the Plaintiff's complaint filed herein, the 
legal time for answering having expired
 f and the default of the 
said Defendant in the premises having been duly entered according 
to law, now upon the application of Plaintiff to this Court, 
judgment is hereby entered against said Defendant in pursuance of 
the prayer of said complaint. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises 
aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that said Plaintiff 
does recover from said Defendant the sum of $8,829.96 with interest 
thereon at the legal rate thereon from the date hereof until paid, 
together with attorneys' fees and costs to the date of April 14, 
i 
1997 in the sum of $377•00 for a total judgement of $9206•96. 
It is ordered that if the judgment is not paid by the 
Defendants, the Defendants interest in the property at issue 
herein, 2769 S. 2420 E. Salt Lake City, Utah, and more specifically 
known as Lot 33, Amended Plat Lakeview Heights, Block Four, parcel 
No. 16-27-203-001, shall be sold to satisfy this judgment. 
It is further ordered that this Judgment shall be augmented in 
the amount of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees expended in 
collecting said Judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be 
established by affidavit. 
Judgment rendered this 
TabD 
Randy B. Birch, #4197 
BERTCH & BIRCH - East 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
114 South 200 West 
Post Office Box 763 
Heber City, UT 84032 
Telephone (435) 654-4300 
Facsimile (435) 654-7576 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 




GAZAL SEMNANI AND KHOSROW B. 
SEMNANI, 
DEFENDANTS. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANN GARZA 
IN RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
CASE NO. 960004927 CV 
JUDGE BURTON 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ANN GARZA, first being duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. That I am over 21, and fully competent to testify as set 
forth herein. 
2. I was responsible for the work done at the Defendants 
property and which is the subject matter of this lawsuit. 
3. I believe that Defendants were properly served at the 
address at Mulholland, and that they were aware of this lawsuit. 
4. Shortly after May 24, 1996, Gazal Semnani, who I 
understood to be the wife of Khosrow Semnani, called me and asked 
12/17/1998 16:52 ?q3RRRfl £N PAGE 01 
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what I was doing. I advised her that she owed & lot of money and 
Ihal I couldn't let it qo. I suggested that .she pay the bill and 
avoid the expenses of attorneys. 
5. On or atout that sanr.e r.imt? Mis. Semnani called Brinton 
Electric and demanded to know the coats of certain appliances that 
I had purchased from Brinton and installed At the property located 
at 2769 s. 2-120 E., Salt Lake City. 
6. Shorr.ly before filing ~he lawsuit, X spoke with a friend 
of Mrs. Semnani, a person I only know as 3adaf, who advised ma that 
the Semnanis livud at the Addres* on Mulholland. 
• */. I further believe that the Defendants were served and knew 
of the lawsuit as Z caused a mechanic's lien to b« filed against 
thp property and the Defendants signed accepting the lien. 
Dated this December H , 1998. 
/ 
'Garza 




RANDY G. BIRCH fe 
\-2lb 5 Connerce QiM4o-*90- V° 
reanj» Lake City utsri s -^07 R e s i d i n g a t 
My CcT-.mission Expiree 
August 0 ?000 
STATE OF UTAH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this December 17, 1998, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be transmitted by facsimile and 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Gary Weston 
NIELSON & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, #1100 




Gary A. Weston, USB No. 3435 
D. Scott Crook, USB No. 7495 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Defendants 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
MURRAY DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHLAND CONSTRUCTION, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
V S . j 
GHAZALEH SEMNANI and KHOSROW ; 
B. SEMNANI, ] 
Defendants. ) 
I ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
> VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
) AND QUASH WRIT OF EXECUTION 
) Civil No. 960004927 
i Judge Michael K. Burton 
The Defendants Khosrow Semnani and Ghazaleh Semnani's Motion to Vacate Default Judgment 
and Quash Writ of Execution was submitted without oral argument to the Court for decision pursuant to 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration on December 24,1998. 
The Court having considered the parties' memoranda and having reviewed the pleadings and 
documents in the file, hereby finds that the defendants knew about this lawsuit in the spring of 1996. 
Accordingly, this Court concludes that there is no reason to set aside the default judgment. 
- 1 -
V 
THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED THAT Defendants' Motion to 
Vacate the Default Judgment and Quash Writ of Execution is hereby DENIED. 
DATED this tr? day of February, 1999. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
J 
c^ 
Honorable Mkhae^KBurton ;-^:K 
District Court YudgfeV, ""~ -- wrf=' ••Vj> 
i£andy 
BERTCH&BIRCH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
89921.SE526.049 - 2 -
